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Abstract
Applying regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009
using new indicators, we find that right-wing governments liberalize more the
financial sector than left-wing governments. We show that if a left-wing gov-
ernment accepts to liberalize the financial sector, an increase of social security
expenditures can facilitate the adoption of a new legislation in the financial
sector. To estimate the impact of the government partisan affiliation on the
corporate governance legislation, we use a probit model and a conditional Cox
model in gap time in 16 OECD over the 1970-2009 period. Statistically, we
find that right-wing governments enhance more pro-shareholder policies.
Keywords: Political Partisanship, financial liberalization, corporate gover-
nance, institutional change
JEL Classification: G38, C33, P16
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Effet partisan et réformes financières
dans les pays développés
Résumé
A partir de régressions en données de panel portant sur un échantillon de 18
pays de l’OCDE de 1970 à 2009, nous trouvons que les gouvernements de droite
libéralisent davantage le système financier que les gouvernements de gauche.
Nous montrons que si un gouvernement de gauche accepte de libéraliser le
secteur financier, une augmentation des dépenses de sécurité sociale peut fa-
ciliter l’adoption d’une nouvelle législation dans le secteur financier. Afin
d’estimer l’impact de l’affiliation partisane du gouvernement sur la législation
relative à la gouvernance d’entreprise, nous utilisons un modèle probit puis un
modèle de Cox conditionnel in gap time pour 16 pays de l’OCDE sur la même
période. Nous trouvons que les gouvernements de droite sont à nouveau plus
enclins à améliorer la législation favorable aux actionnaires minoritaires.
Mots clé: Effet partisan, libéralisation financière, gouvernance d’entreprise,
changement institutionnel
Classification JEL: G38, C33, P16
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 partially undermined the process of financial lib-
eralization that had accelerated since the early 1980s. This process refers to the
reforms within the financial and banking sector and to the corporate governance
reforms (pursued more specifically in Germany, Japan and France). Adopting a
multidimensional definition, financial liberalization refers to measures directed at
dismantling regulatory control over institutional structures, instruments and activ-
ities of agents in different segments of the financial sector. What explains that
governments decided to liberalize the financial sector? Firstly, governments facing
with growing deficits had to find alternative ways other than debt. Secondly, the
aim of the financial reforms was to reinforce the competitiveness of markets in the
financial and banking sector
The corporate governance refers to how the power between stakeholders (i.e. em-
ployees, suppliers, banks and other lenders) and shareholders is shared. Financial
markets and corporate governance are closely linked (La Porta et al., 1997; 1998;
Hall and Soskice, 2001): in that sense, we assume that financial liberalization brings
about major institutional consequences, notably within the industrial relations. Fi-
nancial reforms are affecting financial as well as work relationships. Table 1 shows
the main characteristics of the two "traditional" models of corporate governance:
the "insider" model in Continental Europe and in Japan and the "outsider" model
in the Anglo-Saxon countries1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The aim of this article is to analyze the political determinants of financial reforms
in 18 OECD-countries from 1970 to 2009:
i) Does traditional political partisanship still play a role by explaining financial
reforms? Intuitively, right-wing governments are more likely to liberalize than left-
wing governments. Indeed, each government is concerned to represent the interests
of their constituency. We expect to obtain a positive relationship between the degree
of financial liberalization and the government ideological position (Roe, 2003).
ii) Which political strategy should a left-wing government adopt if it accepts to
liberalize the financial system? We except that left-wing governments implement
compensation mechanisms, particularly addressed to workers who demand more
redistribution and social protection toward an increasing financial integration. For
which reasons would a left-wing government would accept to respond favorably to the
shareholders’ demand? Thus, left-wing governments, that want to be reelected, can
gamble on financial reforms to renew economic growth and to favor competitiveness.
Tiberghien (2007, p.8) calls the "Golden Bargain" the fact that "in exchange for
corporate and structural reforms, global investors offer abundant equity inflows and
the promise of a lower capital cost and increased competitiveness". In that sense,
the government’s decision is influenced by the action of the other governments: when
1For further description of the Anglo-Saxon, German, French and Japanese systems, see Allen
et Gate (2001), Roe (1997), Schmidt (2004), Charreaux and Witz (2007) and Yafeh (2000).
5
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.63
the United States and the United Kingdom decided to open their financial markets,
countries that had maintained capital controls had strong incentive to abolish it.
In this paper, we will take into account the preferences of different actors to
explain the decisions made by governments without neglecting external constraints.
Adopting a political economy viewpoint, we try to identify which socio-political
groups could be formed on the basis of their preferences for financial reforms.
Recent debates in political economy focus on the determinants of structural re-
forms in advanced countries: are structural reforms the result of economic or political
factors (Amable, 2007)? If these reforms are seen as the outcome of economic fac-
tors, some economic constraints (such as growing public deficit) might have reduced
the role of politics and political partisanship: Abiad and Mody (2005) show that
financial liberalization has little to do with political variables for 35 countries in
1973-1996 period. Conversely, some papers highlight that the financial systems are
the results of political choices (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). In that vein, Burgoon
et al. (2008) show that a shift to a left-wing (respectively to a right-wing) govern-
ment decreases (increases) the chances of financial liberalization for the same period
and countries. Kastner and Rector (2005) show, for 12 West-European democracies
from 1960 to 1986, that it is more difficult for a left-wing government to increase
restrictions on capital flows if this government succeeds to a right-wing government.
Quinn and Toyoda (2007) find that capital account liberalization is positively cor-
related with a decline of votes for Communist Party worldwide within 82 countries
from 1955 to 1999. Consequently, a change in preferences among elites and among
voters is interpreted as the origin of institutional change. In this sense, implemented
policies are determined by the ideology shared by political elites. Quinn and Inclan
[1997] identify two effects for 21 OECD-countries from 1950 to 1988: a "partisan
macropolicy effect" and a "partisan price relative effect"2. They also show that
the type of political economy, the independence degree of the central bank and the
political system play an important role in their analysis. All these previous papers,
except Abiad and Mody’s one, show that right-wing governments liberalize more
capital movements than left-wing governments.
We suggest in this article to test the empirical relationship between the degree of
financial liberalization and the government ideological affiliation by using two new
indicators of financial liberalization (Chinn and Ito, 2008 ; Kaminsky and Schmuk-
ler, 2008) and a new government ideological position index (Amable et al., 2006).
Kaminsky and Schmukler’s index captures the internal and external dimensions of
the process of financial liberalization. To estimate the relationship between political
partisanship and corporate governance reforms, we use a dichotomous variable cap-
turing the years during which a pro-shareholder legislation was enacted. Our results
indicate that the partisan hypothesis is verified as in the previous papers. This result
suggests that political parties after their election seek to respond to the demands of
differentiated social groups. We also show that a left-wing government will decide to
liberalize the financial system by increasing the social security expenditures to com-
2The first effect - "partisan macropolicy effect" - refers to the fact that political parties decide
to pursue different macroeconomic policies. The second effect - "partisan price relative effect" -
refers to the country’s factor endowment: two countries with ideologically close governments are
able to adopt different strategies.
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pensate the increasing insecurity for workers exposed to international competition.
Conversely, a right-wing government will less sensitive to these political demands:
its objective will be to reduce tax by opening the capital account. However, this
compensation hypothesis seems not to be verified in the case of corporate governance
reforms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the different preferences
of the main actors influencing the decision to liberalize the financial sector. Section
3 presents the theoretical foundations of the compensation hypothesis. Section 4
analyzes the influence of the institutional framework. Section 5 exposes the empirical
model. Section 6 presents the results of our regressions. Section 7 concludes.
2 Financial liberalization and political preferences
Strong redistributive transfers characterize financial reforms. The redistributive
transfers are inducing strong political conflicts: for this reason, left-wing parties and
right-wing parties will adopt different strategies, particularly in tax policy. They
will pay strong attention to demands from the socioeconomic group(s) that they
are representing. Four actors influence the decision to liberalize the financial sector:
workers, "capitalists" (managers and shareholders), international actors (trading
partners and international institutions) and the government as the arbitrator be-
tween these different demands.
2.1 Political preferences of managers and financial investors
Financial liberalization tends to satisfy the interests of capital holders: strongly in-
tegrated financial markets guarantee a better resource allocation to diversify risks.
Financial liberalization leads to an intensification of competition in the banking and
financial sector, a strong development of securitization operations (on the deriva-
tives markets) and an internationalization of financial markets. According to the
theoreticians of financial liberalization, McKinnon (1973) and Saw (1973), abolish-
ing financial restrictions contribute to attract more deposits because interests rates
are higher and to select only high-productive projects. Financial economists are
assuming that financial liberalization should lead to a perfect equilibrium between
capital supply and capital demand3 and thus to an optimal allocation of capital.
Increasing interest rates facilitates the reduction of inflationary pressures. For these
reasons, financial liberalization is thus consistent with the right-wing governments’
goals (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987). Capital inflows, allowing countries to finance
more investment, tend to reduce the cost of capital. Furthermore, the increasing
competition and the deregulation of the interest rates contribute to reduce the cost
of the financial intermediation. The preferences of commercial banks for financial
liberalization changed over time: indeed, commercial banks were traditionally op-
posed to financial liberalization until the 1970s. Policymakers were concerned to
safeguard the financial stability in postwar time and small banks benefited from
3The effects of financial repression are to hold down interest rates: this leads to low national
savings rates and to a permanent excess of demand of lendable funds. Increasing interest rates
may increase savings rate and then stimulate investment and economic growth.
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banking regulation (Economides et al., (1996)). Regulation in the United States,
according to the Economides et al.’s (1996) model, was in the interest of small banks.
But, progressively, commercial banks, after having been merged, wanted to benefit
from the internationalization of the banking and financial activities. The process
of concentration and internationalization of financial institutions accelerated in the
mid-1980s, particularly in Western Europe. In the 1950s and 1960s, commercial
banks benefited from rents due to their monopolistic position. But, these rents were
threatened by the financial openness: incumbent banks had to face with new com-
petitors and those banks wanted to get new profits. Therefore, we can see political
considerations explaining the shift from a strong financial repression in the 1950s to
an increasing financial liberalization situation in the 1970s/1980s. This change in
preferences is reflected by the intense lobbying activity.
At the firm level, integrated and liquid financial markets facilitate the maxi-
mization of shareholder value strategy. Despite higher interest rates the cost of
capital is lower because financial investors decide to invest within the firm and to
bring their capital. Then managers can expect an increase of the profit rate. In
this sense, managers and financial investors have common interests (Checchi, 1996).
By introducing incentive mechanisms or by creating a market for corporate control
shareholders reach to reduce agency costs. These agency costs are intrinsically linked
to managerial control (Berle and Means, 1932). Incentive mechanisms for instance
refer to stock options (Pagano and Volpin, 2005). To attract capital entrepreneurs
have to increase minority shareholder protection. We suppose in this paper as in
the Gourevitch and Shinn’s (2005) "investor model" that agency conflicts between
managers and shareholders disappear by introducing these incentive mechanisms.
Nevertheless, reinforcing the degree of minority shareholder protection can result in
reducing managers’ benefits and more specifically private benefits of control.
2.2 Political preferences of workers
On the other hand financial liberalization contributes to weaken workers’ situation
by reinforcing the international competition and more particularly for low-skilled
workers (Rodrik, 1997). Over years, constituencies of the left have changed with the
decline of the manufacturing working class: the new constituency is now composed
by the economically insecure voters strongly exposed to international competition
(Garett, 1998). Furthermore, capital taxation is more difficult in a world of mobile
capital. For this reason, left-wing parties are fiercely opposed to liberalize capital
flows. Plü¡mper et al. (2009) show that left-wing governments on average set higher
tax on capital income and that differences between capital and labor tax rates are
smaller. Moreover, reinforcing capital mobility can destroy many jobs particularly
in sectors which are strongly exposed to international competition.
Why is a concentrated ownership structure more compatible with the workers’
interests? First, we suppose that left-wing governments will be also not much in-
clined to promote corporate governance reforms whose aim is generally to increase
the power of (minority) shareholders within the firm. Corporate governance reforms
have strong distributional consequences: conflicts between "capitalists" and work-
ers are essentially concentrated around the degree of employment protection and
8
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the wage share of income. On the one hand, workers call for a better employment
protection with stable jobs which seems incompatible with the strategy to increase
short-term corporate profitability. Minority shareholders promote an increase of
the degree of flexibility on the labor market (e.g. by eliminating secure and stable
jobs). The aim of these reforms is to increase the degree of minority shareholder
protection and the transparency rules in accordance with corporate governance rules
(OECD, 2004). In that sense, capital holders would like to eliminate the agency costs
caused by maintaining a high degree of employment protection (Roe, 2003). One the
other hand, workers demand wage increases, even in expense of shareholder value.
The interests of capitalists and workers are thus in conflict (Checchi, 1996). In-
deed, increasing minority shareholder protection and particularly facilitating hostile
takeovers contribute to shift income and wealth from workers to minority share-
holders. It also affects the wage distribution because this strategy implies larger
wage dispersion and consequently a more non-egalitarian income distribution. The
company’s strategy is more compatible with the workers’ interests where ownership
concentration is strong than where the ownership structure is diffuse (Table 1). In
the latter case, the company’s strategy consisting in maximizing shareholder value
may generate negative externalities for workers. Conversely, in the former case,
company internalizes the workers’ interests. Social returns do not differ from pri-
vate returns. Second, left-wing parties also promote a strong economic regulation
on labor and product markets that seems to be more compatible with a high degree
of ownership concentration.
2.3 International cooperation and international organizations
Many studies analyzed the different interactions between national and international
policies. In his model, Putnam (1988) proposes a two-level game in which nego-
tiations in the international framework depend on the country’s national political
situation. Governments taking part in international negotiations pay attention to
satisfy the preferences of their constituents. All participants seek to find a solution
which obtains a majority in view of multiple partisan constraints at the national
level. Internationalization - characterized by network externalities - imposes a mini-
mal level of coordination among countries. In this sense, the action of a government
is directly determined by the behavior of other governments: when one country - the
United States - decided to liberalize capital flows, capital controls became inefficient
and particularly costly for countries which decided to maintain them. According to
Amable and Palombarini (2005, p.263), "the setting up of the international com-
promise will thus depend on the relative power of the concerned government. One
can thus consider that some national compromises are undermined by the arrange-
ments established between governments which will cause an internal institutional
and political change".
Countries coordinate each other by applying convergent policies. International
organizations contribute to define "acceptable policies" (Quinn and Toyoda, 2007)
to pursue at the international level4. How these "acceptable policies" are defined
4Since the 1990s international financial organizations (IFOs) such as the World Bank, Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank for International Settlements (BIS) or the Organization of
9
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depends on a political process: Hall (1993) interprets the major ideological changes
during the 20th century as "paradigm shifts". Hall identified two main paradigm
shifts since the early of the 20th century: after the collapse of Bretton Woods system
in 1973, Monetarism progressively succeeds to the dominant Keynesianism. Eco-
nomic environment changed with the successive economic crises: Keynesian policies
were progressively judged inefficient (Hall, 1993; Helleiner, 1994). Hall notes that
these paradigm shifts depend more on politics than on simple experts’ recommen-
dations. Consequently governments will be more likely to liberalize their financial
sector if international organizations promote economic openness.
International openness also results in reinforcing competition among countries.
Governments pay attention to their level of economic competitiveness. In a world
of mobile asset holders, any increase of capital taxation enhances the fear of capital
flight. Governments are thus not encouraged to increase capital taxation (Personn
and Tabellini, 2000). However, while they compete for internationally mobile cap-
ital, they have also to respond to the demands of their constituents in terms of
public goods. They need tax revenues to finance public goods. Thus, the govern-
ment’s ability to reduce tax on capital income depends on budget constraints and
fairness norms (Plümper et al., 2009).
2.4 The role of government
Government is confronted with heterogeneous demands and has to arbitrate be-
tween these contradictory demands. Right-wing governments will defend "capital-
ists’" interests (managers and shareholders) while left-wing governments tend to
defend workers’ ones. Beyond purely partisan objectives government is also con-
cerned to look at supranational and macroeconomic objectives. Besides their re-
distributive aspect of financial liberalization the policies of financial liberalization
are furthermore aiming at improving economic efficiency and thus stimulating eco-
nomic growth. When the macroeconomic situation deteriorated in the mid-1970s
after several shocks all governments, including left-wing governments, gambled on
liberalization policies that may present high mid-term positive economic benefits
(even though they presented relatively high short-term political costs for left-wing
governments). The growing neoliberal and monetarist ideology seduced most of po-
litical leaders as witnessed the French case: in 1984 the French Socialist government
decided to liberalize the financial sector following the monetarist recommendations
by introducing supply-side policies (politique de rigueur). Following the analysis
developed by Amable and Palombarini (2005), the France’s minority position en-
dangered its economic performances. While liberalizing the financial sector seems
rational for right-wing governments, it is more ambiguous for left-wing governments:
liberalizing the financial sector can be harmful to their traditional constituents but
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have encouraged financial liberalization in ad-
vanced and emerging countries. They have recommended abolishing any form of capital controls,
implementing the OECD "Principles of Corporate Governance" [2004] and ensuring a better mi-
nority shareholder protection. The World Bank or OECD encourage capital market development
which promotes higher economic growth rates while "the IMF and the BIS have a vital interest
in reducing moral hazard in financial sector firms as part of the global challenge of prudential
regulation" (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005, p.100).
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maintaining high financial restrictions can result in high losses in terms of economic
efficiency (Kastner and Rector, 2005).
Therefore macroeconomic aggregates need to be taken into account to liberalize
the financial sector at the international and national levels: low growth rates or a
high public deficit should favor policies of financial liberalization. However financial
liberalization also reinforces the instability of the financial markets as witnessed
more frequent crises since the 1980s. Then a banking or financial crisis are more
likely to increase regulation on financial markets.
3 Financial reforms and political strategy: the com-
pensation hypothesis
3.1 Institutional complementarities and compensation hypoth-
esis
In an approach of political economy the consequence of the strategy of social groups
can be interpreted as the result of institutional change. However institutional change
induces through institutional complementarities a set of changes that may alter
the nature of "Dominant Social Bloc" (DSB) (Amable and Palombarini, 2009).
Moreover, if governments decide not to satisfy the preferences of the DSB, this one
can be transformed or even wiped out: governments are in this case confronted with
an endogenous political crisis. Hence, the process of local institutional change needs
to be very progressive to circumvent that positive externalities from institutional
complementarities turn into negative externalities (Streeck, 2009) that can be at
the root of a welfare reduction for one of the groups from the DSB. To arbitrate
government will choose the least-cost solution priority for the DSB (Amable, 2003).
As previously mentioned, the international dimension of institutional change alters
the socioeconomic equilibrium and the balance of power between different groups.
It may also alter the composition of the DSB.
If a left-wing government decides to liberalize the financial sector because it con-
siders that countries need to coordinate financially (at the international and the
European levels), policymakers can decide to increase social security expenditures
or the degree of employment protection: a left-wing government is more likely to
adopt this strategy to compensate the negative effects of liberalization policies on
workers’ welfare. Compensation hypothesis is based on the idea that globalization
losers, i.e. more insecure individuals, should prefer more social protection and will
support parties that advocate welfare state expansion and more redistribution. It
is supposed that the effects of globalization are different according the individual’s
sector of employment and his factor endowments (Walter, 2010). Following the idea
of Burgoon et al. (2008), we want to test the hypothesis that a rise of social security
expenditures increases the likelihood of liberalizing the financial sector in the follow-
ing year. But, contrary to Burgoon et al. (2008) which show that only an increase
of health spending can compensate the negative effects of financial liberalization, we
want to prove that a left-wing government will increase social security expenditures
before accepting to liberalize the financial sector. Indeed, poor and low-skilled indi-
11
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viduals are more likely to support redistributive policies (Guillaud, 2008). For this
reason, we can consider that insecure individuals are more likely to vote a left-wing
party that advocate welfare state expansion. Then, left-wing governments have to
satisfy the political preferences of those voters. Conversely, right-wing governments
are less concerned to satisfy those preferences and can even be adverse to increase
social security expenditures5.
3.2 The example of the strategy of the "modern" left: the
"Third Way"
Cioffi and Höpner (2006) show that paradoxically recent major corporate governance
reforms were adopted by left-wing governments in Continental Europe. Tiberghien
(2007) looks more particularly at the French case: the French Socialist govern-
ment (1997-2002) voted the law on New Economic Regulations (loi des Nouvelles
Régulations Economiques [NRE ]) which was at the root of an unprecedented wave
of privatizations, a strong reduction in tax on stock-options and the increase of the
rights for minority shareholders in major companies. The aims of these reforms were
to increase the degree of economic competitiveness in France but also to strengthen
the layoff conditions and to introduce the thirty-five-hour week, as compensation
mechanisms.
With the aim of stimulating the economic activity and of finding an efficient way
of funding the retirement pay-as-you-go schemes through private savings, European
Social-Democrats sought to stimulate supply-side policies with more positive fiscal
incentives without giving up integrally demand-side policies "in favor of a fruitful
combination of micro-economic flexibility and macro-economic stability" (Blair and
Schröder, 1999). In other world, the strategy of the "modern" left (or the ’neo-
liberals of the left’) is based on the promotion of competition-enhancing policies
(Amable, 2011). Being aware of harmful effects associated with financial liberaliza-
tion, European Social-Democrats suggested promoting a better access to education
and training and more specifically occupational training.
Despite side payments and social policies that should have compensated the neg-
ative effects of financial liberalization on workers’ welfare, financial reforms largely
weakened traditional constituents from the "old Social-Democracy". In recent times,
the Labor Party in the United Kingdom and the SPD in Germany suffered severe
electoral defeats. These results may be interpreted as a strong demand of a high
partisan differentiation between left-wing and right-wing parties.
4 Partisan politics and political/economic institu-
tions
Institutional complementarities (Hall and Soskice, 2001 ; Amable, 2003), the polit-
ical system and the institutional environment appear as obstacles to institutional
change:
5It can rationale for right-wing governments not to increase social security expenditures, or even
to reduce it.
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Institutional complementarities are likely to occur when "the payoffs of the agents
in one domain may be affected by institutions prevailing in other domains" in such a
way that "individual institutions [in a viable overall institutional arrangement] may
not easily be altered or designed in isolation" (Aoki, 2001, p.225). Many studies (Hall
and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003) show that there are multiple interactions between
financial systems and the other institutional domains: the liberalization of financial
systems is likely to be more compatible with a flexible market of labor (Gatti et
al., 2011), with highly competitive markets of products, with general skills, with
funded retirement scheme and with radical innovations (Hall and Soskice, 2001).
Institutional complementarities between capital, management and labor within the
firm are shown in Table 1.
The ability of one government to implement rapidly reforms depends on the na-
ture of the political system: as Pagano and Volpin (2005) note, majoritarian voting
systems are significantly correlated with a strong shareholder protection and with a
weak protection of employment. In the same vein, Gatti (2009) notes that propor-
tional systems are more encompassing and are associated with stronger labor market
regulation. The impact of the political regime (presidential versus parliamentary)
on the probability of liberalizing the financial sector is more ambiguous: on the one
hand, presidential regimes are characterized by a higher electoral competition and
by stronger interest groups (Lijphart, 1999): in this case, radical shifts are more
likely to occur in presidential regimes while parliamentary regimes are characterized
by a stronger cooperation among parties and among interest groups due to the right
of veto of coalition parties. On the other hand, another argument can be used:
presidential regimes are simultaneously characterized by a higher degree of clarity
of political responsibility for policymakers: for this reason, government will pay at-
tention to implement policies that present short-term electoral benefits. Restrictive
international financial policies are related to a high clear political responsibility for
economic performances (Quinn and Inclan, 1997).
Finally, the institutional environment has to be taken into account: reforming
financial markets depends in part on the degree of central bank independence. As
Mundell (1960) proved, capital account liberalization is associated with an inde-
pendent central bank and floating exchange rate. Governments have to arbitrate
between capital flows liberalization and the use of monetary policy for electoral
purposes.
5 Empirical model
5.1 Estimating financial liberalization reforms
5.1.1 Econometric specification
The aim of this paper is test empirically whether the nature of the reforms within
the financial sector may be explained by the government ideological position in
18 OECD-countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands,
Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Austria, United States, United Kingdom, Ireland,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan) from 1970 to 2009. The equation under-
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lying our estimations is the following:
Yit = αit + β.Iit +
∑
k
ζk.Xk,it +
∑
j
λit + it (1)
with Yit being the dependant variable, αi country fixed effects, Iit the variable
capturing partisanship,
∑
kXk,it a set of control variables, λit a set of year dummies
to account for unobserved year effects and it an error term.
In a second specification of our model, we add an interaction term between our
dependent variable and a variable capturing the social system (i.e. the social security
expenditures)) Sit:
Yit = αit + β1.Iit + β2.Sit + β3.Iit.Sit +
∑
k
ζk.Xk,it +
∑
j
λit + it (2)
The effect of the social system on the degree of financial liberalization is condi-
tional on the government ideological affiliation:
∂E (Yit|x)
∂Sit
= β̂2 + β̂3.Iit (3)
given that x is the vector of explanatory variables. We report marginal effects
of the social security expenditures at different sample values of government ideolog-
ical position (minimum, mean minus one standard deviation, mean, mean plus one
standard deviation, maximum).
5.1.2 Data and variables
To account for partisanship, we use and extend Amable, Gatti and Schumacher’s
(2006) Government Position (GP) variable. This variable is a government ideo-
logical position indicator constructed on the basis on the Comparative Manifesto
Project6 from the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fï£¡r Sozialforschung (WZB). Their
database provides variables for numerous political parties reflecting the relative
frequency of statements in party manifestos on characteristic economic and non-
economic political topics. From this voluminous list of variables, we have chosen a
subset in order to construct a useful indicator.
Let i be the country in question, let r = 1 ... n be the governing parties in
parliament, let sr be the respective last election share of votes, let CrL , L = 1 ... m
be the values of left characteristic variables for party r and CrR , R = 1 ... k be the
values of right characteristics variables for party r, then GP can be written as:
GP =
1
n
∑
r
[(∑
R
CrR −
∑
L
CrL
)
sr
]
(4)
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
6All databases are available on http://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/
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The index of financial openness kaopen proposed by Chinn and Ito (2008) is
an indicator capturing the liberalization of capital movements. This indicator is
available for 182 countries for the time period of 1970-2009. The second indica-
tor is the Kaminsky and Schmukler’s (2008) financial liberalization index FL com-
posed by the sum of three simple indexes proposed by Kaminsky and Schmukler
(2008). No variables are available for Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Australia
and New Zealand. To test the compensation hypothesis, we include a variable
social_securityt−1 comprising the social security transfers as a percentage of GDP
for the previous year only if the government had changed (∆|ideologyit| > 0) and if
the degree of financial liberalization had increased (∆kaopenit > 0 or ∆flit > 0) and
we use the interaction left*social_security and right*social_security. To capture the
role of international openness, we used the variable openness based on the sum of
exports and imports as a percentage of current GDP. We use then the variable
inter_ideology representing support for free-market internationalism proposed by
Burgoon et al. (2008). We use a proxy variable for corporate governance (LLSV )
developed by La Porta et al. (1998) as a summary index of six legal protections
available to external shareholders to test the idea that a pro-shareholder ownership
structure is more compatible with the liberalization of the financial structure. Three
economic variables are included in the regressions: gross domestic product (GDP)
growth, a measure of public deficit from Armingeon et al. (2010) and a dummy of
banking crisis. Inclusion of GDP growth (GDP_Growth) is a way of testing the
idea that financial reforms are motivated by economic performance considerations.
Inclusion of a measure of public deficit (Deficit) allow to test the hypothesis that
governments are concerned to control the public deficit. We use a dummy variable
for banking crisis proposed by Bordo et al. (2001): the variable Banking equals 1
in years of banking crisis. To account for the degree of bank central independence,
we use the CBI indicator proposed by Alesina (1988): this index considers whether
the central bank has final authority over monetary policy, whether government of-
ficials sit on the governing board of the bank, and whether more than half of the
members are appointed by the government. We include two additional institutional
variables: the first variable, majoritarian, indicates whether the voting system is
proportional representation (value 0), modified proportion representation (value 1)
as in France, Australia or in Japan or single-member (value 2) as in the United
States, the United Kingdom or in Canada. The second variable, presidential, indi-
cates whether the political system is presidential (value 1) or parliamentary (value
0).
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here]
5.1.3 Methodology
The OLS regression assumes homoskedasticity and independence of the errors. These
specific hypotheses are not verified. Fixed effects estimation assumes that the in-
fluence of the observed independent variables on the dependent variable needs to
be the same for all individuals. The Hausman test confirms that a fixed effects
test is more judicious (than a random effects test). The null hypothesis of the
Breusch-Pagan test is that of cross-sectional independence. The test rejects the null
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hypothesis7; hence there is spatial correlation in our data. Then, we calculate a
modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals of a fixed ef-
fect regression model. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is strongly rejected8.
The above tests suggest that we might not use the standard fixed effect procedure
without taking into account spatial correlation and panel heteroskedasticity. As a
consequence, we are able to use the ordinary least squares (OLS) with Beck and
Katz’s [1995] panel corrected standard errors (PCSE).
5.2 Estimating Corporate Governance Reforms
5.2.1 Econometric specification
In this second regression, the sample is composed of 16 OECD-countries (Sweden,
Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Austria, United
States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan). The
standard panel probit model is specified in term of the latent regression model:
y∗ = X ′β +  (5)
with X being a regressor vector composing of our ideological variable and our
control variables. In equation (5) y∗ is unobservable and is a measure of an "im-
provement of the minority shareholder protection". We can observe:
y =
{
0 if y∗ ≤ 0
1 if y∗ > 0
5.2.2 Data and variables
We want to assess the impact of discrete legislative events on the duration and
the "quality" of minority shareholder protection (MSP). Each observation records
whether the country adopted a favorable legislation for minority shareholders or not
in a particular year. Comparative work show that a satisfactory measure of cor-
porate governance for use in panel data analysis is currently unavailable (Barker,
2010). The lack of primary data needed to create a new dichotomous dependent vari-
able. First, we identified all corporate governance reforms enacted for the 1970-2009
period in 16 OECD countries. Because information about corporate governance re-
forms in Denmark and in Finland is lacking, we deleted these two countries from our
sample. Then, we distinguished those reforms that represented an improvement of
the minority shareholder protection that includes the adoption of accounting rules
and audit procedures, an independent board, the ability for minority shareholders
to control some strategic decisions and finally the adoption of managerial incentives
7Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: χ2(153) = 1585.04, p < 0.000 for the model with
financial openness (kaopen) as dependent variable and χ2(78) = 1311.54, p < 0.000 for the model
with financial liberalization (fl) as dependent variable
8Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity: χ2(17) = 20973.24, p < 0.000 for the
model with financial openness (kaopen) as dependent variable and χ2(13) = 660.07, p < 0.000 for
the model with financial openness (fl) as dependent variable
16
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.63
(Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005). We examined different types of sources: we used nu-
merous comparative studies on corporate governance produced by the World Bank or
the IFM and comparative reports, corporate governance codes and datasets (Siems
et al., 2009; Tiberghien, 2005). All the identified provisions were included in 154
reforms. France undertook seventeen reforms; the United Kingdom and the United
States fifteen; Germany fourteen; Japan twelve; Italy ten; Spain and Ireland nine;
Sweden and Finland eight; Austria and New Zealand seven; Belgium, Canada and
Australia six; the Netherlands five. Figure 4 shows the number of events enacted
from 1970 to 2009. Although we do not observe a clear increasing or decreasing
trend over time, the first peak of reforms is concentrated at the end of the 1980s
and at the end and beginning of the 2000s after experiencing multiple scandals.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
We also include in this second regression the variables openness, kaopen, majori-
tarian and presidential. We want to test whether corporate governance measures are
sensitive to the economic situation: to test the assumption that a lower economic
growth and a higher public debt should increase the likelihood of enhancing minor-
ity shareholder protection, we use two economic variables GDP Growth and Debt.
Finally, we use the variables EPR and EPT capturing the degree of specific em-
ployment protection: the former refers to employment protection of regular workers
against individual dismissal and the latter refers to regulation of temporary forms
of employment.
5.2.3 Methodology
First, we run regressions with a simple panel probit model. Given the nature of
our dichotomous dependent variable, a probit model seems to be more accurate.
Then, we run multiple regressions with duration models for recurrent and sequen-
tial events. Following the recommendations of the statistical literature, we chose to
use a conditional Cox model in gap time. This model has several advantages over
simple duration models: (i) Cox models with conditional variance-correction and
risks restarted at the last event that account for event dependence; (ii) this model
is used to examine the determinants of the hazard ratewhich is the probability per
time unit that a case that has survived to the beginning of the respective interval
will fail in that interval9. In conditional gap time models, times restart after each
event, the data are then stratified by event number, grouped by country and sepa-
rate baseline hazards are estimated at each occurrence. In our sample, among 640
observations, there are a total of 154 events which each country experiencing an
average of 154/16 ≈ 10 events. By adopting this method, we want to examine the
effect of our ideological variable and of additional control variables on the timing of
legislative adoption of minority shareholder protection legislation.
9Box-Steffensmeier et al. [2007] introduce the conditional frailty model that accounts for both
event dependence and unobserved unit heterogeneity. Conditional gap time models and conditional
frailty models give us substantially equivalent results.
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6 Results
6.1 Partisanship and Financial Liberalization
The OLS regression shows a positive and significant impact of the Left-Right ideo-
logical position of the respective governments on degree of capital movements liber-
alization (Table 2): the more incumbent government is positioned at the right-wing
end of the political spectrum, the higher is the degree of financial liberalization
and financial openness. This relationship remains verified by introducing control
variables. Column [1] gives the result for the four decades: we find a positive and
significant relationship only in the 1980s and the 1990s. Conversely, in the 2000s,
financial reforms seem to have been implemented by left-wing parties confirming the
argument that the increasing financial integration induced left-wing governments to
accelerate the process of financial liberalization in expense of partisan purposes.
Then, we find a positive and significant coefficient for social security expenditures:
when a new government is elected, it decides to increase social security expenditures
before increasing the degree of financial liberalization. We also find as expected that
the strategy of the government differs according its political color: statistically, a
left-wing government will decide to increase social security expenditures whereas
a right-wing government will decide to decrease it. Now we look at the marginal
effect of the social security expenditures on the degree of financial openness (Table
3): when significant, the marginal effect decreases with the government ideological
affiliation. The more the government is at the right-wing of the political spectrum,
the lower will the social security expenditures be and inversely, the more the govern-
ment is at the left-wing, the higher will the social security expenditures be (columns
[6] and [7]).
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]
Regarding the influence of our control variables on the degree of financial open-
ness, we find most of our hypotheses verified: "globalization" seems to have a positive
influence on the governments’ decision: economic openness and "influential ideology"
are associated with positive and significant coefficients (columns [6] and [7]). Then,
regarding the institutional variables, results emphasize a low "complementarity" be-
tween a high degree of capital mobility and a high degree of minority shareholder
protection. Consequently, we cannot conclude that institutional investors will ac-
cept to move their capital only if the host country guarantees a strong degree of
minority shareholder protection. All hypotheses regarding our "economic" variables
are significantly verified: lower growth rates lead governments to open capital ac-
count (column [6]) confirming the results from Quinn and Toyoda (2008) which show
that capital account liberalization had a positive association with growth in both
developed and developing countries. Then, the degree of financial openness and the
public deficit rate are positively and significantly correlated: the higher the deficit
rate (as a percentage of GDP) is, the more likely governments will open capital ac-
count. We find, as expected, that a financial/banking crisis decreases the likelihood
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of opening capital account. But, significativity drops when introducing control vari-
ables. Then, we find the expected relationship between the degree of central bank
independence and the degree of financial openness: as expected, after the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system, governments preferred to choose in favor of capital mo-
bility instead of the use of monetary policies for electoral purposes. Our results show
that majoritarian electoral systems are positively and significantly correlated with
the capital flows liberalization as in Pagano and Volpin (2005). The negative and
significant coefficient associated with the nature of the political regime can at first
sight be understood as a support for Quinn and Inclan (1997) argument that pres-
idential political regime induces governments to implement financial policies that
minimizes the political costs. This result rejects the Lijphart [1999] argument that
presidential regimes are characterized by a stronger degree of ideological cohesion
within the government.
Table 4 shows the results of our first regression by country from 1970 to 2009:
all countries of our sample verify the expected relationship except for Denmark and
the Netherlands and France,(where the results are not significantly). Only Belgium
and New Zealand have a negative and significant coefficient. When the Labor Party
came to power in 1984 in New Zealand, after succeeding to a conservative government
that had maintained high capital controls, the left-wing party strongly liberalized
capital controls. Left-wing government had been seduced by Monetarist ideas. The
objective of the new government was to accelerate country’s internationalization
after having suffered from a deep exchange crisis (Helleiner, 1994).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In our second regression regarding the reforms of financial liberalization, we
make use of a new indicator capturing three different dimensions: the liberalization
of capital account, of bank sector and of stock markets (Kaminsky and Schmuckler,
2008).
The results of our second regression are roughly the same as in the first regres-
sion: right-wing governments are more likely to liberalize financial systems than
left-wing governments. We have a positive and significant relationship in the three
first four decades (column [1]). As in the first regression, the compensation hy-
pothesis seems to be verified because the marginal effect tends to decrease with the
government ideological affiliation (Table 6): a left-wing government is more con-
cerned to compensate the negative effects of financial liberalization on losers than
a right-wing government. Regressions on control variables give us the same results
as in the first regression except for some variables: surprisingly, we find a nega-
tive and significant coefficient associated with the economic openness. We find a
stronger complementarity between the liberalization of the financial sector and the
nature of the corporate governance system. Then, our results for our "economic"
variables seem to be less robust in this second regression: the GDP growth has an
insignificant impact on the degree of financial liberalization, a negative coefficient
is associated with the deficit rate and a positive coefficient with our financial crisis
variable. But, we can admit that governments during an economic and/or banking
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crisis might justify structural reforms in favor of a deeper financial liberalization.
Indeed, according to (neo-)liberal governments, a crisis is the manifestation of some
failures of the economic system. Finally, regarding the nature of the political regime
the results are different if the country is a member or not of the European Union.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
Looking at Table 4, we find the positive and significant relationship between the
degree of financial liberalization and our indicator of government ideological position
except for France, Canada and the United Kingdom with insignificant results.
6.2 Partisanship and Corporate Governance
Results from the probit model and the conditional Cox model in gap time with
legislative events of minority shareholder protection as dependent variable are shown
in Table 7. Results are substantially equivalent in both models.
In the standard panel probit model, we find that a pro-shareholder legislation is
enacted if the incumbent government is a right-wing government. The coefficients
associated with our ideological variable are all significant. This result confirms Roe’s
(2003) empirical study: Roe (2003) compares the political government orientation
(i.e. an average of government position over 1980-1991) with an index of ownership
separation (i.e. the portion of mid-sized firms without a twenty per cent block-
holder in 1995). We believe that our data in this article are more precise to test
our relationship. However, the compensation hypothesis seems not to be verified:
neither employment legislation for protected workers (i.e. with a regular contract)
nor employment legislation for less protected workers (i.e. with a temporary con-
tract) have a significant impact on the probability associated with pro-shareholder
policies. We also find that economic and financial openness increase the likelihood
to promote minority shareholders’ interests. Other economic variables, debt and
economic growth, are not statistically significant. Regarding the institutional vari-
ables, we find Pagano and Volpin’s (2005) result: majoritarian electoral systems are
correlated with a better minority shareholder protection, confirming the result in
Gatti (2009) that proves that proportional election systems favor ownership con-
centration. Looking at Table 4 that presents the results of the probit model by
country, we find that only Austria and Australia have simultaneously a positive and
significant coefficient.
In the following model, a conditional Cox model in gap time, we find that a
right-wing government shapes the hazard of an event. The coefficients of economic
openness and economic growth have the expected sign but are not statistically sig-
nificant. Moreover, we are capable with the variance of the random effect (θ) of
taking into account the influence of unmeasured factors (i.e. legislative traditions)
that may increase the hazard of an event in countries with more adoptions of a pro-
shareholder legislation. We can see that in the three columns the variance of the
frailty is not significant. Results are substantially equivalent after inclusion of several
control variables: as in the probit model, the variables associated with employment
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protection legislation are not significant. Surprisingly, we obtain a negative coef-
ficient associated with the degree of financial openness that becomes significant in
the column [6]. Most of our "economic" variables are nevertheless insignificant. In
conclusion, these results reveal that an election of a right-wing government shortens
the interval between the adoptions of a pro-shareholder legislation.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
7 Concluding remarks
The aim of this article was to test empirically the relationship between the financial
reforms and the government ideological affiliation on a pooled time-series cross-
section data set, comprising observations on 18 countries, covering the time period
between 1970 and 2009. Our results emphasized a strong relationship between the
decision to liberalize financial markets and the government ideological affiliation.
In order to estimate the impact of partisanship of corporate governance reforms,
we first identified major reforms in this field and then ran different regressions.
Consequently, contrary to the argument confirming that structural reforms should
only respond to economic imperatives, we find that politics and political partisanship
still matter.
These empirical results indicate that financial liberalization - defined in a large
sense - includes institutional and redistributive issues: in a mobile capital world,
institutional investors should decide to invest more easily their money in a business
in a country where they can benefit from a strong protection. Minority shareholders
require stronger protection of their assets: companies have to improve transparency
- by adopting accounting rules and audit procedures -, board independence, minor-
ity voting rights over strategic decisions and finally managerial incentives. Even
though financial markets are more integrated in most of developed countries with a
better legislation in favor of financial investors, some countries ensured that workers’
rights are preserved. Consequently, economic and political institutional factors are
affecting the government’s decision. Due to these redistributive issues, individuals
will express conflicting demands in the political space.
The originality of the present work is then to use new measures of financial de-
velopment (financial openness, corporate governance . . . ), to take into account the
interaction between the process of financial liberalization and the corporate gov-
ernance reforms and to adopt a multidimensional approach. This article aims at
emphasizing that the political differentiation remains despite of globalization pres-
sures. Moreover, we show that left-wing governments will simultaneously decide to
liberalize the financial sector and to increase social security transfers to compensate
the negative effects associated with the process of financial liberalization on left-wing
constituents. Thus, institutional change is determined by political factors (Amable
and Palombarini, 2009) and parties’ strategy may change over time because the
preferences of socioeconomic groups are changing. As previously noted, political
parties can be also influenced by a global ideology. In that sense, globalization also
played an important role.
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Table 1: Main characteristics of the two corporate governance models
"Insider" model (Continental
Europe & Japan)
"Outsider" model (Anglo-Saxon
countries)
Ownership
structure
Concentration ownership: large share-
holders/"blockholders" (banks, big
families, State)
Diffusion ownership: minority share-
holders (institutional investors)
Financing
systems
Bank financing (Hausbank, main bank,
. . . ): control over the firm via debt
Arm’s length financing: control over
the firm via equity
Company’s
goals
Company’s stability and growth: Shareholder value maximization:
- Shareholders pursue strategic interests - Shareholders pursue financial interests
- The representation rights of workers
are strong
- The representation rights of workers
are weak
- The structure of decision making is
consensual
- The structure of decision making is
hierarchical
Control
mecha-
nisms
Internal control
Corporate control (proxy contest,
friendly or hostile takeovers)
.
Adaptation of Aguilera & Jackson (2003)
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Table 2: Impact of political partisanship on the degree of financial openness (PCSE
estimation)
Variables
Dependent variable:
Capital account liberalization (KAOPEN )
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Ideology 0.0137*** -0.0001 0.0027 0.0036*** -0.0021* 0.0078*** 0.0766***
(0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0060) (0.0024) (0.0085)
Social_Securityt−1 -0.0075 0.0191*** 0.0178**
(0.0080) (0.0046) (0.0090)
Left*Social_Security -0.0004 0.0003** 0.0053***
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0006)
Right*Social_Security 0.0000 -0.0008*** -0.0044***
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0006)
GDP_Growth -0.0249 -0.0180** -0.0251
(0.0180) (0.0082) (0.0218)
Openness -0.0012 0.0035*** 0.0048**
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0020)
Inter_ideology 0.0149*** 0.0107*** 0.0093***
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0020)
LLSV 0.0605*** 0.0208 0.0227
(0.0116) (0.0217) (0.0200)
Deficit 0.0143*** 0.0238*** 0.0591***
(0.0052) (0.0068) (0.0180)
Banking -0.1465*** -0.0975* -0.1549
(0.0496) (0.0550) (0.1169)
CBI 0.4440*** 0.5552*** 0.7759***
(0.0246) (0.0233) (0.0483)
Majoritarian 0.3624*** 0.5202*** 0.2033***
(0.0284) (0.0637) (0.0757)
Presidential -0.2426*** -0.2145*** -0.6526***
(0.0209) (0.0187) (0.1222)
1970-1979 -0.0028
(0.0037)
1980-1989 0.0097***
(0.0025)
1990-1999 0.0123***
(0.0031)
2000-2009 -0.0094***
(0.0015)
Constant 1.5062*** 1.0572*** 2.1884*** 0.0700 -1.2972*** -0.5289*** -1.0355***
(0.1089) (0.0574) (0.0423) (0.0449) (0.0909) (0.0187) (0.2041)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 702 702 702 702 702 702 369
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 12
R2 0.04 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.55 0.61 0.77
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3: Marginal effect of the social security expenditures (PCSE estimation)
[2] [6] [7]
min -0.0155 0.0352** 0.3744***
(0.0247) (0.0141) (0.0468)
mean_less_1sd -0.0043 0.0150** 0.1655***
(0.0069) (0.0058) (0.0203)
mean 0.0004 0.0064*** 0.0775***
(0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0092)
mean_plus_1sd 0.0051 -0.0021 -0.0103***
(0.0081) (0.0017) (0.0031)
max 0.0115 -0.0136** -0.1297***
(0.0183) (0.0062) (0.0175)
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Impact of political partisanship on the degree of financial liberalization
(PCSE estimation)
Variables
Dependent variable:
Financial Liberalization (FL)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Ideology 0.0082*** -0.0019 0.0069*** 0.0046** 0.0191*** 0.0232** 0.0175*
(0.0023) (0.0061) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0008) (0.0058) (0.0098)
Social_Securityt−1 0.0175* -0.0251*** 0.0003
(0.0093) (0.0071) (0.0092)
Left*Social_Security -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Right*Social_Security 0.0002 -0.0028*** -0.0023***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0007)
GDP_Growth -0.0192 0.0036 0.0081
(0.0186) (0.0164) (0.0140)
Openness -0.0123*** 0.0020 -0.0024**
(0.0032) (0.0015) (0.0012)
Inter_ideology 0.0432*** 0.0451*** 0.0499***
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0020)
LLSV 0.1218*** -0.0006 0.0453***
(0.0276) (0.0168) (0.0153)
Deficit -0.0437** -0.0505*** -0.0596***
(0.0169) (0.0092) (0.0104)
Banking 0.6250*** 0.6421*** 0.2433**
(0.0207) (0.0765) (0.1006)
CBI 0.0425** 0.0567 0.2156***
(0.0183) (0.0410) (0.0146)
Majoritarian 0.2915*** 0.2785*** 0.1771***
(0.0427) (0.0407) (0.0457)
Presidential 0.3125*** 0.5142*** -0.2329***
(0.0470) (0.0475) (0.0608)
1970-1979 0.0273***
(0.0065)
1980-1989 0.0017
(0.0035)
1990-1999 0.0023*
(0.0015)
2000-2009 ?
Constant 8.9799*** 2.4832*** 7.4937*** 8.4966*** 8.5914*** 6.8169*** 6.4927***
(0.0999) (0.1262) (0.0778) (0.1175) (0.1013) (0.1340) (0.1212)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 512 512 512 512 512 512 284
Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 9
R2 0.71 0.44 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.88
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
? : constant dependent variable
Table 6: Marginal effect of the social security expenditures (PCSE estimation)
[2] [6] [7]
min 0.1867*** 0.1131*** 0.0773*
(0.0423) (0.0314) (0.0405)
mean_less_1sd 0.0520*** 0.0494*** 0.0311*
(0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0176)
mean -0.0046*** 0.0226*** 0.0117
(0.0010) (0.0060) (0.0080)
mean_plus_1sd -0.0613*** -0.0042*** -0.0078***
(0.0139) (0.0021) (0.0020)
max -0.1382*** -0.0406*** -0.0342**
(0.0313) (0.0120) (0.0148)
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Summary statistics
Variables Mean SDbw SDwth b/w Min Max N n T
Ideology 0.45 10.17 14.70 0.69 -59.48 42.29 712 18 39
Financial Openness 1.52 0.61 1.04 0.58 -1.84 2.47 714 18 39
Financial Liberalization 7.51 0.60 1.79 0.33 3.00 9.00 520 13 40
Shareholder Protection 0.24 0.09 0.42 0.22 0.00 1.00 640 16 40
Social Security Exp. 14.11 3.36 2.64 1.27 3.72 28.91 695 18 39
Economic Openness 53.14 35.31 18.78 1.35 9.81 163.48 720 18 39
Global Ideology 10.02 0.00 16.58 0.00 -40.00 37.00 648 18 40
GDP Growth 2.86 0.66 2.04 0.32 -6.20 11.50 697 18 39
Anti Director Index 3.27 1.40 0.50 2.86 0.00 5.00 657 17 38
Deficit 0.33 1.54 3.06 0.50 -9.93 16.13 685 18 38
Banking 0.17 0.08 0.37 0.22 0.00 1.00 720 18 40
Debt 60.24 20.71 20.97 0.99 7.95 175.27 625 18 35
Central Bank Indep. 2.53 0.85 0.74 1.15 1.00 4.00 691 18 38
Employ. Protec. Regular 1.97 0.83 0.20 4.15 0.17 3.88 380 16 24
Employ. Protec. Temporary 1.85 1.33 0.65 2.05 0.25 5.38 380 16 24
Majoritarian 0.59 0.78 0.25 3.12 0.00 2.00 713 18 39
Presidential 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 713 18 39
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Table 9: Variable description
Variables Description Source
Financial
Openness
Index de jure measuring a country’s degree of capital
account openness: KAOPEN is based on the binary
dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restric-
tions on cross-border financial transactions reported in
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The authors as-
signed dummy variables for the four major categories on
the restrictions on external accounts: a first variable in-
dicating the presence of multiple exchange rates, a sec-
ond variable indicating restrictions on current account
transactions, the third variable indicating restrictions
on capital account transactions and a last variable indi-
cating the requirement of the surrender of export pro-
ceeds: these variables are equal to one when the capital
account restrictions are non-existent. The higher the
index is, the more open the country is to cross-border
capital transactions.
Chinn & Ito,
[2008]
Financial
Liberal-
ization
Capital account is fully liberalized if (i) banks and cor-
porations are allowed to abroad mostly freely, (ii) there
are no special exchange rates for either current account
or capital account transactions and (iii) there are no re-
strictions to capital outflows. If these criteria are not
fulfilled, capital account is not liberalized. Finally, cap-
ital account is partially liberalized if (i) banks and cor-
porations are allowed to borrow but subject to certain
restrictions, (ii) there are special exchange rates for cur-
rent account or capital account transactions and (iii)
there are some restrictions to capital outflows. Domes-
tic financial sector is fully liberalized if (i) there are
no controls on interest rates, (ii) no credit controls and
(iii) deposits in foreign currencies are likely allowed. If
these criteria are not fulfilled, domestic financial sector
is not liberalized. Finally, domestic financial sector is
partially liberalized if (i) there are controls in lending
rates and borrowing rates, (ii) controls in the allocation
of credit controls and (iii) deposits in foreign currencies
are likely not allowed. Stock market is fully liberalized
if (i) foreign investors are allowed to hold domestic eq-
uity without restrictions and (ii) capital, dividends, and
interest can be repatriated freely within restrictions. If
these criteria are not fulfilled, stock market is not lib-
eralized. Finally, stock market is partially liberalized if
(i) foreign investors are allowed to hold up to 49% of
each company’s outstanding equity and (ii) capital, div-
idends and interest can be repatriated but not before
two-to-five years of the initial investment.
Kaminksy &
Schmukler,
[2008]
33
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.63
Variables Description Source
Government
Position
Our indicator takes account of ideological changes even
within a given party or coalition. In that sense, such
an indicator is preferable to an ordinary binary vari-
able capturing the ideological affiliation of a party.
We have chosen many statements in order to con-
struct our indicator. We can identify right-wing state-
ments raising the indicator’s value and left-wing state-
ments lowering the indicator’s value. Left-wing state-
ments include positive statements on market regu-
lation (per403), economic planning (per404), Keyne-
sian demand management (per409), controlled econ-
omy (per412), Marxist analysis (per415), social jus-
tice (per503), Welfare State expansion (per504), social
harmony (per606), labor groups (per701), underprivi-
leged minority groups (per705) and negative statements
on military (per105) and traditional morality (per604).
Right-wing statements include positive statements on
military (per104), governmental and administrative effi-
ciency (per303), political authority (per305), free enter-
prise (per401), incentives (per402), economic orthodoxy
(per414), Welfare State limitation (per505), traditional
morality (per603), law and order (per605) and negative
statements on labor groups (per702). This indicator is
the vote-weighted mean of the indicators of all governing
parties for a multi-party government.
Amable,
Gatti &
Schumacher,
[2006]
Social
security
expendi-
tures
Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP Armingeon
et al., [2010]
Growth
of real
GDP
Growth of real GDP, percentage change from previous
year
Armingeon
et al., [2010]
Economic
Openness
Sum of exports and imports as a percentage of current
GDP
Penn World
Table (7.0)
Global
ideology
Worldwide support for free-market internationalism
based on the positive statements from the CMP
database on free enterprise (per401), protectionism
(per406), controlled economy (per412), nationalization
(per413) and on the negative statements on protection-
ism (per407). Net free-market internationalism is equal
to (per401+per407)-(per406+per412+per413). Then,
this index is multiplied by the party-year scores by the
percentage of votes. Finally, this index is a 5-year mov-
ing average and an average for the whole international
system by taking the unweighted average for 25 coun-
tries per year.
Burgoon et
al., [2008]
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Variables Description Source
Anti-
Director
Rights
(LLSV )
Six rights measure the degree of minority shareholder
protection: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail
their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to
deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’
Meeting; (3) cumulative voting is allowed; (4) an op-
pressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the country
grants shareholders a preemptive right to buy new issues
of stock, which can be waived only by a shareholder vote
and (6) when the minimum percentage of share capital
that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary
Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10%. The
index is formed by adding 1 when these criteria are ful-
filled.
Pagano
& Volpin,
[2005]
Public
Deficit
Annual deficit (government primary balance) as a per-
centage of GDP.
Armingeon
et al., [2010]
Banking Cri-
sis
Dummy variable equal to 1 in years of banking crisis Bordo et al.,
[2001]
Central
Bank Inde-
pendence
Index by Alesina, [1988]: from 1 to 4, the higher, the
more independent. This index considers whether the
central bank has final authority over monetary policy,
whether government officials sit on the governing board
of the bank, and whether more than half of the members
are appointed by the government.
Armingeon
et al., [2010]
Majoritarian
voting
system
Variable equals 0 with a proportional representation, 1
with a modified proportional representation and 2 with
a single-member representation
Huber et al.,
[2004]
Presidential
political
regime
Variable equals 0 with a parliamentary regime and 1
with a presidential regime
Huber et al.,
[2004]
Employment
Protection
of Regular
Workers
(EPR)
Employment protection of regular workers against in-
dividual dismissal is composed of a notification proce-
dures of dismissal, delay involved before notice can start,
length of the notice period at, severance pay, defini-
tion of justified or unfair dismissal, length of trial pe-
riod, compensation following unfair dismissal, possibil-
ity of reinstallement following unfair dismissal, maxi-
mum time to make a claim of unfair dismissal
OECD
Library
Employment
Protection
of Tempo-
rary Forms
(EPT )
Regulation of temporary forms of employment is com-
posed of valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts
(FTC), maximum number of successive FTC, maximum
cumulated duration of successive FTC, types of work
for which temporary work agency (TWA) employment
is legal, restrictions on number of renewals, maximum
cumulate duration of TWA contracts, the requirement
of the set-up of a TWA, the equal treatment of regular
and agency workers at the user firm
OECD
Library
Public Debt Gross government debt (financial liabilities) as a per-
centage of GDP.
Armingeon
et al., [2010]
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Figure 1: Government Ideological Position Index (1970-2009)
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Figure 2: Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index (1970-2009)
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Figure 3: Kaminsky-Schmukler Financial Liberalization Index (1970-2009)
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 Figure 4: Minority Shareholder Protection Improvement events in 16 OECD coun-
tries (1970-2009)
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